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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This non-capital Bonneville County case, is related to two capital cases prosecuted close
in time to this case, one from Bonneville County and the other from Bingham County. This
Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence in each of these three cases. 1 Indeed,
initially, this case and the Bonneville County capital case were charged in a single complaint. 2
Further, as the prosecution made abundantly clear in its closing argument to the jury in the
Bonneville County capital case, a single actor allegedly committed the kidnaping, robbery, rape
and murder. Thus, the impact of an exoneration in that case must extend to this one. Further,
the State's ballistics expert opined that a gun purportedly associated with Appellant was used to
shoot the fatal shots in each of the three related cases. The Bonneville prosecuting attorney
argued in closing to the capital case jury that since the gun was used to kill the victim in that case
was seized from nearby a car Appellant abandoned on a Nevada highway median, it is clear that
Appellant committed the murder. In the instant case, the prosecution relied in its offer of proof
on the asserted fact that according to its ballistics expert Wally Baker, "one of the bullets
retrieved from Nolan Haddon's body [was) fired by the .38 caliber revolver that was found
adjacent to the green LTD in Nevada" which Appellant was seen leaving on a highway median in
Nevada. Haddon C.R. at 470 (plea agreement). Because the prosecution relied on Appellant's
proximity to the gun and the expert testimony that the mortal shot came from that gun for the

1

Rhoades v. State, 120 Idaho 795,820 P.2d 665 (Idaho!991) (Bingham County); Rhoades
v. State, 121 Idaho 63,882 P.2d 960 (ldahol991) (Bonneville County capital case); Rhoades v.
State, 119 Idaho 594,809 P.2d 455 (Idahol991) (Bonneville County non-capital case).
2

Though this case was charged as a capital case as well, Mr. Rhoades entered an Alford
plea in exchange for a sentence less than death. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

inference that Appellant was the perpetrator, a showing that he was not the perpetrator in the
Bonneville capital case requires granting him post-conviction relief or, minimally, an opportunity
to proceed beyond the summary dismissal stage in postconviction proceedings in the court below.
In 2005, Appellant filed with the court below his Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
("Petition") seeking relief on four grounds. C.R. at 3. Each ground related to FBI testing in the

Bonneville County capital case of swabs used to recover evidence, which turned out to be semen,
from the victim's mouth and vagina. The prosecution had conducted its own testing on the
swabs before having them sent to the FBI. In particular, the Idaho crime laboratory performed
PGM testing. The Idaho crime laboratory's test results showed that Appellant could have been
the contributor because Appellant's and the swab's PGM shared certain features. See infra at nn.
3 & 4.

However, at the prosecution's request, the FBI laboratory conducted more refined PGM

testing which "did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen." C.R. at 34
(Affidavit In Support Of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at Appendix 2, p., 2 (sworn

declaration of Dr. Hampikian). Shortly after receiving this information regarding the FBI's
laboratory report, Appellant filed his Petition.

2

A.

The First Ground's Three Critical Points: The Bonneville County
Capital Case Prosecution (1) Knew Or Should Have Known That
FBI Pre-trial Testing Performed At The Prosecution's Request
Excluded Appellant As A Contributor Of The Semen Removed
From The Victim; (2) Elicited But Did Nothing To Correct Patently
False Trial Testimony From Its Forensic Expert That Appellant Was
A Potential Contributor Of The Semen Removed From The Victim,
And Failed To Correct That Same Expert's Misleading Testimony On
Cross-Examination; And (3) Exacerbated This Misconduct By Asserting
In Closing Argument To The Jury That Appellant "Matched" The
Semen When Its Expert Had (Falsely) Testified That Appellant Was
Only a Possible Contributor, Together And Separately Constituting
Egregious Misconduct In Violation Of State And Federal Constitutional
Guarantees.
Two documents were attached to Appellant's Affidavit In Support Of Petition For Post-

Conviction Relief("Supporting Affidavit"): (I) the FBI document dated about six months pre-trial
which memorialized the results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to the PGM testing
for the prosecution by the state laboratory, of swabs of semen removed from the victim's mouth
and vagina3 (see C.R. at 30, Supporting Affidavit at Appendix I), and (2) the June 20, 2005,
sworn statement, from Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in forensic biology and a Boise State
University associate professor with a joint appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice
Administration,' in which he noted that while the State ofldaho Forensic Laboratory testing

on swabs of semen removed from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential

3

The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state
laboratory.
4

Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to
full professor and granted him tenure.
3

contributor of the semen[,) .. .the more refined test performed by the FBl 5, at the request
of the Idaho lab, did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen." C.R. at
34 (Supporting Affidavit at Exhibit 2, p. 2). 6
5

Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit 1 and dated about six months pre-trial.
6

ln the related Bonneville County capital case postconviction proceedings regarding DNA
testing and now before this Court on review as Case No.34236, Appellant filed an additional
sworn statement from Dr. Hampikian regarding the FBI testing (the same testing at issue in the
instant case). There, to remove the possibility that a court might think that the information in Dr.
Hampikian's June, 2005, affidavit was unavailable to forensic experts at and before the time of
Appellant's trial, Appellant filed a second affidavit from Dr. Hampikian in December, 2005. In
that supplemental affidavit, Dr. Hampikian attests that:
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I
reached in my June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally
accepted by forensic biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it
also was a basic tool known to and employed by forensic experts in
investigating offenses where evidence containing body fluids might
help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I
employed using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987,
on a par with similar uses of blood typing test results. Indeed, the
State crime laboratory letter to the FBI Laboratory's Forensic
Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard and
typical request when it was made on June 3, 1987. See Appendix 1
(State ofldaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of
Laboratories' senior Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum' s letter to
FBI) .... Ms. Marcum's correspondence shows clearly that the
State ofldaho crime laboratory reflected the universal acceptance
by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM subtyping
and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I
arrived at in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by
the FBI in its July 13, 1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear,
unambiguous, and used a standard reporting language that would
be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic biologist of the
day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ...
.This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the
donor of the semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore,
there is no indication in the FBI report that this finding could be an
artifact, or that there was any evidence of a mixture in the sample.
The standard and universally accepted conclusion in 1987 (as

4

The Affidavit In Support Of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief notes that:
While [the prosecution] knew or should have known that the FBI
laboratory report exonerated Petitioner, it not only failed to dismiss
the charges against Petitioner, it elicited testimony from its forensic
expert...that his ... PGM test results revealed that Petitioner was a
potential contributor of the semen recovered from the victim. See,
e.g. Tr. at 1687-89.
C.R. at 23 (Supporting Affidavit at 3). The prosecution forensic expert also testified that the
PGM test results from swabs of the crotch of the victim's sweatpants revealed that Appellant was
a potential contributor. 7 While the prosecution's forensic expert's direct examination testimony
was true as far as it went, the prosecution omitted to elicit information critical to fully and fairly
evaluating the state crime laboratory's test results. Specifically, the prosecution failed to inform
the jury through this expert witness or any other witness that the more refined FBI laboratory
tests yielded results which contradicted the Idaho crime laboratory test results. In failing to do
so, the prosecution engaged in the functional equivalent of suborning perjury. The prosecution
exacerbated its misconduct by allowing its expert witness, on cross-examination, to further
mislead the jury that the scientific testing conducted on the recovered semen inculpated
Appellant even though it knew or should have known that the testing exculpated him:

Q.

. ..Now, as I understand it, there's also other tests

today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic] does
not match the questioned semen sample (QI) taken from the
victim's body. Paul Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of
the semen sample QI.
R. Vol. I, p.199-202 (emphasis added).
7

Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547 Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.1661, Ls. 11-12; p. 1663,
Ls. 13-25; & p. 1164, Ls. 1-9.

5

available to subtype or subclass the PGM
readings?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And it's a fact that you personally did not run any
of those tests, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

Would that not have been helpful to you in further
including or excluding possible donors in this
particular case?

A.

Those samples were sent off for that subtyping.

Q.

And they were also inclusive weren't they?

A.

I can't address those results, I did not do the
analysis.

Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547, Tr. at 1779 (emphasis added). Worse, in closing
argument, the prosecution transformed its forensic expert's sworn description of Appellant as a

possible contributor [in]to a "match."
Who matches that semen? Only the defendant, Paul Ezra Rhoades .
. . .He, alone of the persons who had access, matches.

And as between those two men seen in that van this defendant,
Paul Ezra Rhoades, is the only one who, matches those
characteristics.

There's an interesting point that both semen samples, that in the
vagina and that in the mouth match this defendant, they match each
other. What does that tell us? That they were deposited by the
same individual. It's not coincidence that they're the same, but
they're the same because they were deposited by this defendant.
6

Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547, Tr. at 2120-21 (emphasis added).
Based on the FBI document, Dr. Hampikian's sworn statement, and transcript excerpts,
Appellant claimed in his First Ground that the prosecution's (1) failure to advise trial counsel or
subsequent counsel of the FBI testing's exoneration of Appellant, (2) failure to dismiss the
charges against Appellant, (3) failure to correct its expert witness' false and misleading
testimony, and (4) exaggeration of that witness' testimony in guilt phase closing argument
violated Appellant's rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (I 963), Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 (cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited) and 13 (due process guaranteed) of the Idaho Constitution, as
well as Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636, 647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the State requests
would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive
post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed
by prosecutorial misconduct.").

B.

Second Ground: Appellant's Actual Innocence Of The Crimes Of
Conviction Follows, Inferentially, From The Prosecution's Evidence,
The Prosecution's Its Contention That A Single Individual Was
Responsible For Criminal Acts In The Related Bonneville County
Capital Case, And The FBI Laboratory's Exclusion Of Appellant
As A Source Of The Semen Removed From The Victim.
In his Second Ground for post-conviction relief, Appellant claimed that he was actually

innocent of the offenses of conviction as well as any of their lesser included offenses. He
claimed, alternatively, that if he was unable to meet the actual innocence burden required for

7

release, he would at least meet the burden required to have all previously defaulted claims
considered on their merits. This ground rested on the FBI's test report and Dr. Hampikian's
sworn statement described above as well as the prosecution's contention that the rapist and killer
in the Bonneville County capital case was a single person. It was brought pursuant to Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we
have noted, ... a majority of the Justices in Herrera would have supported a claim of freestanding actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); 19-4901 et seq., the Idaho
Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1 (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 (equal
protection guaranteed), 3 (United States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas
corpus guaranteed), 6 (cruel and unusual punishment prohibited), 13 (due process guaranteed),
and the United States Constitution, Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to Appellant's proposed Second
Ground, this appeal is brought pursuant to those same authorities.

C.

Third Ground: Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By
Failing To Provide Critical Information To Its Forensic Expert
Regarding The FBI Testing.
In his Third Ground for postconviction relief, Appellant claimed that trial counsel-the

same counsel for Appellant as in his Bonneville County capital case-failed to provide the
defense forensic expert with sufficient and available information regarding the PGM testing.
Specifically, Appellant noted that while their expert questioned whether the swab contained
spermatozoa or, instead, the victim's cells, trial counsel failed to provide the expert with
information available to them that each of the swabs represented excellent semen samples.
8

Appellant asserted upon information and belief that had the defense expert been apprised of this
information, he would have modified his opinion from one which neutralized the FBI report to
one which viewed it as plainly exculpatory. Appellant also asserted upon information and belief
that defense counsel's failure in these regards also precluded defense counsel from (1)
appreciating the critical need to pursue forensic testing of all available biological evidence and
(2) preparing adequate cross-examination of the State's forensic expert regarding the FBI's PGM
testing in the Bonneville County capital case and, then, eliciting testimony regarding its
exculpatory implications for Petition in this case. Of course, Appellant also alleged that but for
this deficient performance, the outcome of the state proceedings underlying the instant case
would have been different.

D.

Fourth Ground: Appellant Should Be Allowed To Conduct DNA
Testing On Biological Evidence Collected During The Investigation
Of The Offense Underlying These Proceedings.
In light of the new understanding of the FBI' s test results, Appellant contends that he

should be allowed to conduct deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") testing on any and all biological
evidence collected by the State in the investigation of the murder which gave rise to the instant
case. Without limiting the requested testing to them, Appellant enumerated particular items
which he sought to be tested, specifically a glass vial containing a scraping collected at the crime
scene and coming, according to the police who collected it, possibly from the perpetrator;
fingernail scrapings collected from the victim, Nolan Haddon; a blood stained !-shirt removed
from Mr. Haddon; and a vial of dry blood, a bloody one dollar bill, and clothes from Mr.
Haddon. C.R. at 14-15 (Petition/or Post-Conviction Relief at 12-13). The State disclosed no
9

direct evidence-scientific, eyewitness, or otherwise-placing Appellant at the scene at the time of
the offense, let alone showing that he committed the offense. C.R. at 14 (Petition For Post-

Conviction Relief at 12).

E.

The Lower Court's Rationale For Summarily Dismissing The Petition.
The court below summarily dismissed all four claims, ruling that each was filed outside

the one year statutory limitations period, I.C. §19-4902, and that Appellant was not entitled to
equitable tolling on any of them. The court below denied equitable tolling despite the
prosecution's violating Appellant's federal and state constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process in the Bonneville County capital case (1) by failing to fully and honestly discharge its
constitutional obligations to advise him at any time before the defense discovered through its
own independent inquiry that the F.B.I. testing conducted at the prosecution's request
contradicted the results from the state crime laboratory testing 8;(2) by eliciting the functional
equivalent of perjured testimony from its serological expert witness and failing to take any steps
to advise the jury, court or defense that the testimony was false; and (3) by exaggerating the false
testimony, thus exacerbating its prejudice, in closing argument. Those violations led to
Appellant's conviction and death sentence in that case. But for his conviction and death sentence
in that case, he would not have pleaded guilty in the instant case.

8

The expert was retained out of an abundance of caution, and his conclusions were made
shortly before Appellant filed his Petition.
10

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Generally,
Appellant claimed that the prosecution would not have obtained the conviction in the instant
case, through an Alford plea, but for its misconduct in the related Bonneville County capital case,
in which a jury had convicted Appellant of first degree murder. 9 See supra.
Appellant was put on notice of those claims when his retained expert genetic biologist,
Dr. Hampikian, provided his opinion that the FBI test results excluded Appellant as a contributor
of the semen collected from the victim. Appellant received that opinion shortly before filing his

Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and supporting documents. Appellant had retained Dr.
Hampikian out of an abundance of caution in this case where the Appellant's life hangs in the
balance, not because he had at that time evidence of prosecutorial misdeeds. The district court
dismissed as untimely all of Appellant's claims, ruling that his Petition was not filed within the
statutorily mandated time and that he was not entitled to any equitable tolling.
Thus, there are two related issues in this appeal:
(1)

Whether the district court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief for untimely filing even though Appellant had no notice of the
prosecutorial misconduct claims ("First Ground") or the scientific basis for his actual
innocence claim ("Second Ground"), his ineffective assistance of counsel claim ("Third
Ground"), or his claim to test the biological evidence for DNA ("Fourth Ground") until
he consulted an expert out of an abundance of caution, and even though neither trial

9

An appeal of denial of post-conviction relief in that related Bonneville County capital
case is now pending before the Court as Case Number 34236.

11

defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of
prosecutorial misdeeds, absent notice of their existence;
(2)

Whether the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to
determine whether Appellant was entitled to equitable tolling and, alternatively, whether
in any event Appellant met the standard which the district court erroneously employed.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH ENTITLEMENT TO EQUITABLE TOLLING.

Idaho Code Section I 9-490l(b) provides that Idaho law is clear that a successive
postconviction petition is timely if (I) it was not reasonable to expect the petitioner to have
known of its underlying facts at the time of his first petition and (2) if the successor petition was
filed within a reasonable amount of time of his discovering the underlying facts. This Court has
noted several strict rules created and enforced to ensure the integrity of trials as a truth finding
process. These rules and their purpose are relevant here.
Defense attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that
prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties, including the
duty to disclose exculpatory material. [Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 286-87 (1999)].
A State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false
testimony, to obtain a conviction[,] Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959)[, and that] [t]his standard applies not only to false evidence
solicited by the prosecution, but also to false evidence that the
prosecution allows to go uncorrected. Id A stricter materiality
standard applies to cases involving the prosecution's knowing use
of false testimony than to cases where the prosecution has failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. at I 03-04. This is

12

because these cases "involve a corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process." Id at 104. In Bagley, the U.S.
Supreme Court quoted Agurs for "the well-established rule that a
conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (quoting Agurs,
427 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added). "[T]he fact that testimony is
perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 680.

Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641,647 & 649, 8 P.3d 636,642 & 644 (2000). Further, "[a] stricter
materiality standard applies to cases involving the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony
than to cases where the prosecution has failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S.
[97], 103-04 [(1976)]. This is because these cases 'involve a corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process.' Id. at 104." Sivak.
Idaho Code Section 19-4908 provides that there may be "sufficient reason" for not
asserting or inadequately raising a ground for relief in an original, supplemental, or amended
petition. That section also provides that postconviction claims are not waived by petitioners
unless done so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
The court below dismissed the petition because Appellant purportedly "failed to establish
that he is entitled to equitable tolling" of the statutory limitation period for filing the petition. As
shown below, though, the lower court's conclusions cannot be squared with the evidence
contained in the Petition and Supporting Affidavit.
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A.

The court below abused its discretion in finding that Appellant presented no
evidence "that the prosecution knew of an alternative interpretation of the
FBl's PGM report at the time of trial and deliberately withheld that
information from Petitioner."

Contrary to the lower court's finding, Appellant presented material evidence that the
prosecution in the Bonneville County capital case knew that the results contained in the FBI's
PGM report contradicted the state laboratory's test results. In particular, Appendix 1 of the
Supporting Affidavit is a copy of the FBI's PGM Report addressed to the attention ofa "Senior

Criminalist" (Ms. Pamela J. Marcum) at the Idaho state crime laboratory and dated July 13, 1987,
over half a year before the case went to trial. That report notes that the FBI testing was requested
by the state crime laboratory, specifically by the Senior Criminalist, on June 3, 1987. Further,
Appendix 2 of the Supporting Affidavit is a sworn statement from Appellant's forensic biology
expert, Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. Dr. Hampikian attested that:
During the investigation of the rape and murder of Susan
Michelbacher, the State ofldaho Forensic Laboratory conducted
PGM testing. Its testing did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a
potential contributor of the semen. However, the more refined test
performed by the FBI, at the request of the Idaho lab, did
absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen. See
Appendix I (State Laboratory cover letter to FBI lab.).
C.R. at 34 (Supporting Affidavit at Appendix 2, p. 2, para. 6). Subsequently, Appellant filed a
second sworn statement from Dr. Hampikian in which he noted that the FBI' s more refined
testing was the more discriminating (as compared to the state laboratory's testing) and the thenestablished state of the art forensic PGM subtyping test. Dr. Hampikian continued:
It is accepted forensic science that less discriminating test results
must be interpreted in light of subsequent more discriminating test
results. Considering less discriminating test results and ignoring
subsequent, more discriminating and, therefore, definitive results
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in unacceptable forensic scientific practice. Basing a conclusion
solely on the State laboratory's PGM test when the FBI's more
discriminating test results were available would make little sense,
assuming that the goal was a reliable conclusion. I have read Mr.
Wyckoff s and all other relevant trial testimony regarding the
State's PGM testing as well as the State's and FBI laboratory
reports and correspondence. It is troubling that while Mr.
Rhoades' jurors learned of the State's PGM test results, they were
never presented testimony or documents regarding the FBI's more
discriminating PGM test results. This omission promoted the
incorrect inference that Mr. RHoades was a possible contributor of
the detected PGM; in fact, the FBI's results excluded him.
C.R. at 84 (Attachment to Affidavit In Support Of Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal

Based Upon Statute ofLimitations at 2).
Even if the state crime laboratory and the FBI laboratory were not so obviously agents of
the Bom1eville County Prosecuting Attorney's Office for purposes of investigating the
Bollleville County capital case, it is beyond dispute that the FBI crime laboratory and state crime
laboratory analysts were aware of the report's meaning. Otherwise, the state analysts' sending
the evidence to the FBI laboratory for more refined testing would have been senseless. C.R. at 34
(Sworn Declaration of Dr. Hampikian at 2). The prosecuting attorneys should likewise have
known the report's meaning. As the Supreme Court has held, "the individual prosecutor has a
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in
the case[.]" Kylesv. Whitley,5!4U.S.419,437(1995).
Further, the district court assertion that Appellant's understanding of the FBI report is an
"interpretation" has no basis in the record evidence. The only explanation of the FBI report
before that court was from Appellant's expert, Dr. Hampikian. Dr. Hampikian did not provide
an opinion or "interpretation." Rather, he noted in no uncertain terms that the FBI testing results
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absolutely excluded Appellant as the source. Likewise, there can be no question that the
prosecution was or should have been aware of this meaning and, therefore, corrected its
serological expert's false testimony.
Finally, even if there are competing interpretations of the FBI report, the evidence before
the court below was that at least one credible interpretation wholly exculpated Appellant. The
prosecution knew or should have known this. Consequently, the prosecution would still have
been obligated to correct its expert's testimony that his PGM testing showed that Appellant was
within the universe of possible contributors. This is because the FBI's more refined testing
showed otherwise. Specifically, on this view of the FBI's report-a view wholly unsupported by
record evidence-its more refined testing showed that Appellant may have been excluded from
the universe of possible contributors. In short, even if the FBI's report provided a less than
certain result, the uncertainty that Appellant was within the universe of possible contributors
would have contradicted the state crime laboratory's certain result that Appellant was within that
universe.

B.

The court below abused its discretion in finding that Appellant presented no
evidence "that the prosecution's serological expert's testimony was perjured,
let alone at the elicitation of the prosecution."

For the same reasons and based on the same authorities provided in the previous
subsection, Appellant contends that the lower court abused its discretion in finding that
Appellant presented no evidence that the prosecution's serological expert's testimony was
perjured, let alone at the elicitation of the prosecution. The prosecution knew or should have
known of the FBI test results and their meaning. With that information, the prosecuting attorneys
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knew or should have known that their serological expert provided the functional equivalent of
perjured testimony when he testified about the state crime laboratory's PGM test results while
omitting any mention of the FBI laboratory's more refined PGM test results.

II.

THE LOWER COURT USED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD TO
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT
HE WAS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE TOLLING.
In addition to abusing its discretion in its factfindings, erroneously applied two legal

standards. First, the lower court held Appellant to a high federal legal standard which Idaho has
never adopted. In particular, noting that entitlement to equitable tolling in federal habeas
proceedings turns on the petitioner's showing that some extraordinary circumstance stood in the
way of his timely filing, the court below went on to rule that Appellant failed to meet that burden.
C.R. at 90 (Memorandum Decision And Order On Motion For Summary Dismissal at 6).
However, even if the "extraordinary circumstances"standard did properly apply here, Appellant
met it.
Defendants are entitled under the Idaho and federal constitutions to rely on the
prosecution abiding its legal obligations. Idaho Const. art. I, § I I; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The United States Supreme Court has summarized the long established legal framework
describing the government's responsibilities and defendants' correlative rights in litigation:
It has long been established that the prosecution's "deliberate
deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false
evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice."
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quoting Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. I 03, 112 (1935) (per curiam)). If it was
reasonable for Banks to rely on the prosecution's full disclosure
representation, it was also appropriate for Banks to assume that his
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prosecutors would not stoop to improper litigation conduct to
advance prospects for gaining a conviction. See Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Strickler v. Greene, 527U.S. 263,
284 (1999) .
. . . The State ... suggests that Banks's failure, during state
postconviction proceedings, to "attempt to locate Farr and ascertain
his true status," or to "interview the investigating officers, such as
Deputy Huff, to ascertain Farr's status," undermines a finding of
cause; the Fifth Circuit agreed.... In the State's view, "[t]he
question [of cause] revolves around Banks's conduct," particularly
his lack of appropriate diligence in pursuing the Farr Brady claim
before resorting to federal court.... We rejected a similar
argument in Strickler . ... Our decisions lend no support to the
notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed
Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such
material has been disclosed. As we observed in Strickler, defense
counsel has no "procedural obligation to assert constitutional error
on the basis of mere suspicion that some prosecutorial misstep may
have occurred." 527 U.S., at 286-287. The "cause" inquiry, we
have also observed, turns on events or circumstances "external to
the defense." Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,222 (1988) (quoting
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488 (1986)).
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694-695 (2004) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Having

laid out the framework of fairness by which the government is constitutionally mandated to
litigate criminal cases, the Court went on to reject the very argument which Respondent makes in
the instant case -that if a postconviction petitioner discovers the prosecution's concealed
wrongdoing only after the statutory limitations period has expired, any claim based on that
wrongdoing must be dismissed as untimely. The Supreme Court squarely rejects this position:
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that "the prosecution
can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to ...
discover the evidence," Tr. of Oral Arg. 35, so long as the
"potential existence" of a prosecutorial misconduct claim might
have been detected, id., at 36. A rule thus declaring "prosecutor
may hide, defendant must seek," is not tenable in a system
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.
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"Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly
discharged their official duties." Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,
909 (1997) (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.,
272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). We have several times underscored the
"special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for
truth in criminal trials." Strickler, 527 U.S., at 281; accord, Kyles
[v. Whitley], 514 U.S. 419, [] 439-440 [(1995)]; United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,675, n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985); Berger, 295 U.S., at 88. See also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438,484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Courts,
litigants, and juries properly anticipate that "obligations [to refrain
from improper methods to secure a conviction] ... plainly rest[ing]
upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed."
Berger, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct. 629. Prosecutors' dishonest
conduct or unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial
approbation. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440 ("The prudence of the
careful prosecutor should not ... be discouraged.").
Banks at 696. Similarly, this Court has held that even where procedural obstacles would

otherwise bar considering it, Idaho courts must entertain evidence of actual innocence where it is
"clearly material or ha[s] been suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct." Sivak v. State, 134
Idaho 641,647 & 649, 8 P.3d 636,642 & 644 (2000). "We must be vigilant against imposing a
rule oflaw that will work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency." Id.
Appellant maintained in district court and continues to maintain that he legitimately relied
on the prosecution meeting its constitutional obligations and that, therefore, he was under no
obligation to hire an expert to independently examine the prosecution's scientific results to check
whether the prosecution was meeting its pretrial obligations and to determine during trial whether
any prosecution witnesses gave false testimony.
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CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, considered together and independent, the Court should either grant
post-conviction relief or remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate and
conduct further proceedings on the Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
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